4
and its Member States, as they would require the conclusion of so-called mixed agreements to be negotiated and concluded by both the EU and its Member States. 8 Thus, the question was everything but "academic". This limiting interpretation of the new investment powers of the EU was supported by valid arguments. The EU's and earlier the EC's CCP powers were traditionally aimed at reducing obstacles to international trade in order to pursue its trade liberalization credo. Previous enlargements of the CCP in the field of services were interpreted restrictively by the European Court of Justice (ECJ), limiting the EC's power to the cross-border (trade equivalent) mode of supply in the language of the GATS. 9 And traditionally, the EC/EU acted in the field of investment only as regards liberalization and access/admission rules, as was evident in the so-called Minimum Platform on Investment, 10 as well as ensuing trade negotiations with third countries that incorporated investment liberalization, but excluded post-establishment investment protection. 11 This limiting interpretation could also find support in the language of the Lisbon Treaty amendments, in particular Article 206 TFEU which speaks of the "progressive abolition of restrictions on international trade and on foreign direct investment", suggesting that the CCP is primarily concerned with access/admission aspects. By comparison Article 207(1) TFEU is more ambiguously worded. Its reference to the "conclusion of tariff and trade agreements relating to trade in goods and services, and the commercial aspects of intellectual property, foreign direct investment, […] " can be read as support of the limiting interpretation if one understands that "foreign direct investment" is the other subject-matter "the commercial aspects of" which may be addressed in CCP treaties. However, it is equally plausible to consider that "foreign direct investment" is the third field of "trade agreements" the EU may enter into, after those "relating to trade in goods and services" and those relating to "the commercial aspects of intellectual property".
Not surprisingly, it is this latter reading which is vigorously adopted by the EU Commission. The Commission considers that the EU's investment power is not limited to the access/admission questions regarding investments. Rather, it comprises both the pretype whereas investment protection agreements that go beyond this would have to be concluded as mixed agreements."); available at http://www.bundesverfassungsgericht.de/entscheidungen/es20090630_2bve000208en.html. 8 11 See footnote 14 to Article 7(10) Free Trade Agreement between the European Union and its Member States, of the one part, and the Republic of Korea, of the other part, OJ L 127 (May 14, 2011) 6, expressly stating that investment protection is not covered by the section on establishment. 5 establishment as well as the post-establishment phase and would thus allow the EU to conclude treaties containing the traditional substantive treatment obligations of IIAs and procedural guarantees in the form of state-to-state and investor-to-state dispute settlement (ISDS), albeit in the adapted version of allowing the EU to (partly) replace its Member States as respondent. 12 The EU Commission equally rejects a narrow reading of its investment powers as powers limited to FDI. Though the wording, and thus the "ordinary meaning", of the TFEU appears to be clear, the Commission in particular asserts that the EU's investment power also includes an implied power concerning portfolio investments.
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A separate but related issue is the question whether the new investment power of the EU implies that BITs between Member States have become incompatible with EU Law and may have to be terminated.
14 While the Commission has clearly expressed this view, 15 investment tribunals have generally upheld their jurisdiction based on the continued validity of so-called intra-EU-BITs.
16

III. The start of the debate on future EU IIAs
As outlined above, the immediate aftermath of the entry-into-force of the Lisbon Treaty was dominated by the debate between the EU Commission and the EU Member States on the appropriate division of their respective powers in the field of investment. Much time and effort was spent on both sides to claim and to defend treaty-making powers as regards IIAs with third states which may have prevented them to devote sufficient energy to the fashioning of a new investment policy of the Union. The official and publicly available documents in this direction are still rather limited.
In July 2010, two Commission documents were made public. One is a Draft Regulation of the European Parliament and the Council establishing transitional arrangements for bilateral investment treaties between Member States and third countries;
17 the other is a Communication outlining the future EU investment policy. 18 This was followed by a Commission proposal in summer 2012 on a regulation addressing the issue of allocating financial responsibility between the EU and its Member States in case of investment arbitration.
19 12 See infra text at note 86. 13 See infra text at note 114. 14 See infra text at note 177. 15 See EC Letter of January 13, 2006 , quoted in Eastern Sugar v. Czech Republic, Eastern Sugar BV v. Czech Republic, 27 March 2007 , SCC Case No 088/2004 Eureko, OLG Frankfurt, Case No. 26 SchH 11/10, Order, 10 May 2012. 17 Commission Proposal of 7 July 2010 for a Regulation of the European Parliament and the Council establishing transitional arrangements for bilateral investment treaties between Member States and third countries, COM(2010) 344; available at http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2010/july/tradoc_146308.pdf. 18 European Commission, Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, The Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, Towards a comprehensive European international investment policy, 7 July 2010, COM(2010) 343 final 4; available at: http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2010/july/tradoc_146307.pdf. 19 Commission Proposal of 21 July 2012 for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing a framework for managing financial responsibility linked to investor-state dispute settlement tribunals established by international agreements to which the European Union is party, COM(2012) 22 On 5 July 2011, the Commission adopted a Follow up to this resolution. 23 However, as of December 2012, the proposals have not led to the adoption of any formal legal instrument and, in particular, they have not yet been accompanied by a clear indication on the part of the EU how it intends to use its new investment power in order to structure future IIAs. 24 Thus, any assessments on the path the EU is likely to follow as regards IIAs must be based on inferences drawn from the scarce proposals available and some informally leaked documents from the negotiating process of comprehensive trade agreements with third states the EU Commission is currently engaged in.
At present, it is difficult to ascertain any clear directions from the three main EU players concerning future EU IIAs. Nevertheless, certain general positions have become apparent by now. While the Commission seems intent to assert its broad new investment powers as a question of principle, it is struggling to provide content to its exercise. Gradually, this content takes shape and now seems to encompass, in addition to market access provisions, all traditional investment protection standards, including ISDS. The position of the Council reflects the diverse interests of the Member States, which it represents in their entirety, ranging from those states which would prefer to keep the status quo ante and thus their sole responsibility for the conclusion of investment protection treaties to those which are content with the Lisbon shift of powers to the EU. The Council's compromise position appears to be its insistence on investment as an area of mixed competences between the Union and its members. As regards the substance of the EU's future IIA policy, the Council seems to favour a traditional "European" approach of strong investment protection including ISDS. The European Parliament equally has to find its new role after the Lisbon Treaty amendments of the CCP which gave it the right to be consulted during negotiations and requires its consent for treaty conclusions. While siding with the Commission in demanding broad investment powers for the EU, the Parliament seems to be developing its own position on the contents of future EU IIAs. In particular, it appears much more reluctant towards the traditional strong investor protection contained in many European BITs and has called for sufficient attention to be given to non-investment interests as well as the Union's right to regulate and pursue its policies without being hampered by concerns over investment claims. Thus, the Parliament's position on investment protection including ISDS is much more nuanced, if not reserved, than that of the two other main EU institutions. 
IV. Current EU negotiations on IIAs or investment chapters in Free Trade Agreements (FTAs)
Making use of the EU's new investment treaty-making power, the EU Commission is currently engaged in negotiations with Canada, India and Singapore on comprehensive trade agreements which will include an investment chapter.
25 Though reports about the negotiating process are limited, some information can be gleaned from excerpts of the confidential Negotiating Directives issued by the Council which have been made public by NGOs.
For instance, the Council Negotiating Directives of 12 September 2011 26 concerning the negotiations with Canada, India and Singapore contain valuable information on the EU's official position with regard to a number of investment related issues. They comprise information confirming the EU Commission position that the EU now has a comprehensive investment power by outlining that an investment chapter should include fair and equitable treatment (FET), full protection and security, national treatment and most-favoured-nation (MFN) treatment as well as guarantees against uncompensated expropriation and an umbrella clause. As regards the level of detail, the instructions appear to favour the traditional European approach by adhering to a rather concise treaty text, without clarifications limiting the scope of FET and indirect expropriation as they are know from US and Canadian BITs as well as NAFTA. 27 In fact, avoidance of "NAFTA-contamination" was reportedly a specific wish of some Member State officials.
28 With regard to dispute settlement, the need for direct investor-state arbitration seems to be unquestioned, though the precise contours are still open given the difficulty of access to ICSID (and ICSID Additional Facility) dispute settlement which appear to be the Commission's favourite venues.
29
Other negotiations announced in the Commission's 2010 Communication, such as those with China and potentially Russia, 30 have not yet materialized to an extent that would allow precise conclusions as to the emerging contours of future EU IIAs.
V. The emerging contours of future EU IIAs
Though the precise shape of EU investment agreements as currently negotiated with Canada, India and Singapore remains open to be finalized, the past negotiation process and, in particular, the Council Negotiating Directives concerning these states together with other official statements, in particular the 2010 Commission Communication on an international investment policy of the EU, permit the observer to make some inferences. 25 On the negotiations with Canada see C. Lévesque, "The Challenges of 'Marrying' Investment Liberalisation and Protection in the Canada-EU CETA", in M. Bungenberg, A. Reinisch and Ch. Tietje (eds.) , EU and Investment Agreements. Open Questions and Remaining Challenges (Nomos -Hart Publishing, 2013) 121-146. 26 Council Negotiating Directives (Canada, India and Singapore), 12 September 2011; available at http://www.bilaterals.org/spip.php?article20272&lang=en as well as at http://www.s2bnetwork.org/themes/euinvestment-policy/eu-documents/text-of-the-mandates.html. 27 See infra notes Error! Bookmark not defined. and Error! Bookmark not defined.. 28 Luke E. Peterson, "EU member-states approve negotiating guidelines for India, Singapore and Canada investment protection talks; some European governments fear "NAFTA-contamination", Investment Arbitration Reporter, 23 September 2011, available at http://www.iareporter.com/articles/20110923_2. 29 See infra text at note 84. 30 The Commission Communication, COM (2010) 343 final 4, supra note 18, 7, mentions both states as potential future negotiation partners, and considers to negotiate even a stand-alone investment agreement with China. As regards a potential agreement with China see also W. Shan and Sh. Zhang, "The Potential EU-China BIT: Issues and Implications", in M. Bungenberg, A. Reinisch and Ch. Tietje (eds.) , EU and Investment Agreements. Open Questions and Remaining Challenges (Nomos -Hart Publishing, 2013) 87-120.
In general, it seems that by now the EU is determined to seek a high level of protection for its investors abroad. The Council has acknowledged this aim by calling for "the highest possible level of legal protection and certainty for European investors in Canada/India/Singapore" 31 and Commission officials have asserted that the Commission would "go for the 'gold standard' of investment protection provisions," 32 based on the existing practice of EU Member States. 33 This indicates the awareness of the need to go beyond a common lowest denominator when drafting future investment agreements. 34 While expecting that such a high level of investor protection will "increase Europe's attractiveness as a destination for foreign investment,"
35 the 2010 Commission Communication 36 as well as the Council Negotiating Directives also admonish the need to guarantee an appropriate regulatory space for the EU and its Member States by cautioning that an EU investment agreement "shall be without prejudice to the right of the EU and the Member States to adopt and enforce, in accordance with their respective competences, measures necessary to pursue legitimate public policy objectives such as social, environmental, security, public health and safety in a nondiscriminatory manner."
37
A. The scope of future EU IIAs
As regards the scope of future investment agreements, the EU obviously plans to adhere to the concept of modern investment agreement practice to include both FDI and portfolio investments, 38 even if this comes at the price of not being able to exercise an exclusive CCP competence.
39 Indeed, investment agreements limited to FDI would be highly unusual andbecause of the difficulty in distinguishing between FDI and portfolio investments in specific cases -might lead to protracted jurisdictional disputes not in the interest of investment protection. According to the Council Negotiating Directives with Canada, India and 31 Council Negotiating Directives (Canada, India and Singapore), supra note 26. 32 Hoffmeister and Ünüvar, "From BITS and Pieces towards European Investment Agreements", supra note 6, 70. 33 Also the 2010 Commission Communication repeatedly mentions member State BIT provisions "that should inspire the negotiation of investment agreements at the EU level." Commission Communication, COM (2010) 343 final 4, supra note 18, 8 (concerning umbrella clauses). Similarly, the Council considered that "provisions of future EU investment agreements" should be fleshed out "on the basis of the experience and the best practices of the Member States." Council Conclusions, 3041 st Foreign Affairs Council Meeting, supra note 20, para. 15. Also the EP considered "that future investment agreements concluded by the EU should be based on the best practices drawn from Member State experiences." Parliament Resolution, supra note 21, para. 19. 34 The Council Negotiating Directives (Canada, India and Singapore), supra note 26, expressly state that the provisions of the investment chapters to be negotiated "shall be built upon the Member States' experience and best practise regarding their bilateral investment agreements." 35 The Council Negotiating Directives (Canada, India and Singapore), supra note 26. 36 In order to allow the EU to pursue public policy objectives, the Commission Communication, COM (2010) 343 final 4, supra note 18, 8, recalls "that the Union's trade and investment policy has to fit with the way the EU and its Member States regulate economic activity within the Union and across our borders. Investment agreements should be consistent with the other policies of the Union and its Member States, including policies on the protection of the environment, decent work, health and safety at work, consumer protection, cultural diversity, development policy and competition policy." 37 The Council Negotiating Directives (Canada, India and Singapore), supra note 26. As to the need to balance investor protection and the regulatory freedom of host states, see infra text starting at note 153. 38 See supra note 13. 39 The Council Negotiating Directives (Canada, India and Singapore), supra note 26, state that the Commission should aim at including "into the investment protection chapter of the agreement areas of mixed competence, such as portfolio investment, […] ." For a more expansive interpretation of the EU's powers, see the Commission's view supra note 13.
Singapore, the investment protection chapters of these agreements "shall cover a broad range of investors and their investments, intellectual property rights included, whether the investment is made before or after the entry into force of the agreement."
40 Commentators have equally stressed that the EU should strive for a "broad definition of investment with a non-exhaustive list". 41 This would imply that future EU IIAs are likely to contain a broad asset-based definition of "investment" as currently contained in most EU Member State BITs. Uncertainty may stem from the fact that the EP has expressly called for the exclusion of "speculative forms of investment". 42 In practice it would appear difficult to distinguish between "speculative" and "non-speculative" portfolio (or even direct) investment.
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B. Admission/access provisions
Past agreements of the EC/EU dealing with investments largely addressed questions of admission only and did so by adopting a GATS-inspired market access approach, i.e. making specific commitments in specific areas. 44 The EU institutions have in general confirmed their intention to continue this policy of market access/liberalisation. 45 However, it is unclear whether the current market access approach will be continued or whether the EU will adopt the North American practice of extending national treatment to the admission phase in order to secure market access as found in NAFTA as well as US and Canadian BITs.
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C. Substantive investment protection
As regards substantive treatment of investments, it appears that future EU IIAs will include all the standards of treatment currently contained in EU Member State BITs. Again, the Council Negotiating Directives with Canada, India and Singapore are most instructive in this regard because they are most detailed. They contain basically all the treatment standards that can be found in modern BITs, from FET, full protection and security, national treatment and MFN, 40 The Council Negotiating Directives (Canada, India and Singapore), supra note 26, under "Scope". 41 46 See e.g. Article 1102 (1) North American Free Trade Agreement between the Government of Canada, the Government of the United Mexican States, and the Government of the United States of America (NAFTA) (Dec. 17, 1992) , 32 I.L.M. 289 (1993) ("Each Party shall accord to investors of another Party treatment no less favorable than that it accords, in like circumstances, to its own investors with respect to the establishment, acquisition, expansion, management, conduct, operation, and sale or other disposition of investments."); Article 3(1) Canadian Model FIPA 2004 ("Each Party shall accord to investors of the other Party treatment no less favourable than that it accords, in like circumstances, to its own investors with respect to the establishment, acquisition, expansion, management, conduct, operation and sale or other disposition of investments in its territory."). See also the discussion in St. Woolcock, "The EU Approach to International Investment Policy after the Lisbon Treaty", Study for the EP Committee on International Trade 2010, 31 et seq.
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to compensation guarantees in case of expropriation and free transfer obligations. 47 In addition, they call for "rules concerning subrogation" which are typical in case an insurer compensates an investor and then needs to be able to raise claims against the host state. 48
Umbrella clauses
The version of the leaked Negotiating Directives concerning Canada, India and Singapore is a bit more ambiguous with regard to umbrella clauses since they are mentioned with question marks under "other effective investment protection provisions". 49 Indeed, umbrella clauses have been controversial in investment arbitration practice as regards their practical effect.
50
Some tribunals follow the approach of SGS v. Pakistan which rejected the view that "breaches of a contract […] concluded with a State (widely considered to be a matter of municipal rather than international law) are automatically 'elevated' to the level of breaches of international law." 51 Other tribunals adhere to the traditional view endorsed by SGS v. Philippines that an umbrella clause "makes it a breach of the BIT for the host State to fail to observe binding commitments, including contractual commitments, which it has assumed with regard to 47 Pursuant to the title "Standards of treatment" of the Council Negotiating Directives (Canada, India and Singapore), supra note 26, "the negotiations shall aim to include in particular but not exclusively the following standards of treatment and rules: a) fair and equitable treatment, including a prohibition of unreasonable, arbitrary or discriminatory measures, b) unqualified national treatment c) unqualified most-favoured nation treatment, d) protection against direct and indirect expropriation, including the right to prompt, adequate and effective compensation e) full protection and security of investors and investments, f) other effective protection provisions, such as ?umbrella clause? g) free transfer of funds of capital and payments by investors h) rules concerning subrogation." Except for subrogation provisions, all these standards can also be found in the Commission Communication, COM (2010) 343 final 4, supra note 18, 8-9. See also the Council Conclusions, 3041 st Foreign Affairs Council Meeting, supra note 20, para. 14, according to which the Council "STRESSES the need to ensure the inclusion in the substance of future negotiations of the fundamental standards of "fair and equitable treatment", nondiscrimination ("most-favored-nation treatment" and "national treatment"), "full protection and security" treatment of investors and investments, protection against expropriation (including the right to prompt, adequate and effective compensation), free transfer of funds of capital and payments by investors, as well as other effective protection provisions (such as, where appropriate, the so-called "umbrella clauses") and dispute settlement mechanisms and CONSIDERS that these principles should be the main pillars of future EU investment agreements." 48 
Non-discrimination standards
With regard to the main substantive standards it appears that the EU is determined to follow the path of traditional short formulations found in most EU Member State BITs, though it is difficult to judge this from the available documents alone. The wording of the Council Negotiating Directives with Canada, India and Singapore may be viewed as mere headings.
54
While the Commission has asserted that "non-discrimination should continue to be a key ingredient of EU investment negotiations," 55 it remains unclear whether future national treatment and MFN clauses should be limited to the post-establishment phase or extend to the admission phase, thus de facto allowing for market access.
56
On the basis of present EU documents it is also not clear whether the institutions have formed an opinion on whether a MFN clause should encompass dispute settlement as in the Maffezini case 57 or not. 58 This indecision may result from the fact that investment jurisprudence is highly inconsistent, with tribunals disagreeing sharply whether MFN clause should permitted claimants to invoke more favourable procedural, maybe even jurisdictional, 59 provisions in third country BITs or at least to overcome procedural obstacles, such as waiting periods, 60 or whether it would not permit so. Finally, with regard to the Council's directives suggesting that the Commission should negotiate "unqualified" national treatment and MFN provisions, it may be unclear whether this implies that such clauses should follow the traditional "European" approach of merely providing for non-discrimination 62 or whether it would allow specifications to "like circumstances" as often found in North American IIAs 63 . 64 However, the Parliament's wish clearly suggests that such a specification should be adopted. 
Fair and equitable treatment as well as full protection and security
Concerning FET and full protection and security, the EU seems determined to continue the traditional IIA policy of its Member States to adopt short provisions. Already the 2010 Commission Communication qualified these standards as "an important element among others that should inspire the negotiation of investment agreements at the EU level."
66 Indeed, there are good arguments in favour of the straightforward versions of FET omitting any references to the "international minimum standard", as found in NAFTA, 67 or US BITs, 68 or qualifications of the full protection and security to include "legal protection", as found in some German BITs 69 . 11 (2001) this was held to be coextensive, and thus limited, to the protection available under the international minimum standard ("1. Article 1105(1) prescribes the customary international law minimum standard of treatment of aliens as the minimum standard of treatment to be afforded to investments of investors of another Party. 2. The concepts of 'fair and equitable treatment' and 'full protection and security' do not require treatment in addition to or beyond that which is required by the customary international law minimum standard of treatment of aliens."). 68 Article 5 US Model BIT 2004 ("1. Each Party shall accord to covered investments treatment in accordance with customary international law, including fair and equitable treatment and full protection and security. 2. For greater certainty, paragraph 1 prescribes the customary international law minimum standard of treatment of aliens as the minimum standard of treatment to be afforded to covered investments. The concepts of "fair and equitable treatment" and "full protection and security" do not require treatment in addition to or beyond that which is required by that standard, and do not create additional substantive rights.") 69 Article 4 (1) Germany/Argentina BIT ("Investments by nationals or companies of either Contracting Party shall enjoy full legal protection and full legal security in the territory of the other Contracting Party." 
Transfer clauses
The Council Negotiating Directives with Canada, India and Singapore may again be relied upon to presume that future EU IIAs will routinely include guarantees on the "free transfer of funds of capital and payments by investors." 73 Already the 2010 Commission Communication stated that "EU clauses ensuring the free transfer of funds of capital and payments by investors should be included."
74 Given the Commission's rigorous approach to defend the EU's capacity to impose limits on such free transfer obligations for political reasons at any time, 75 it is to be expected that future free transfer clauses will contain express exceptions allowing the EU legislator to adopt restrictive measures under Article 66 76 and 215 TFEU. 77 It asset would be achieved. In the instant case, "security" is qualified by "legal". In its ordinary meaning "legal security" has been defined as "the quality of the legal system which implies certainty in its norms and, consequently, their foreseeable application. 
Expropriation
The question whether the EU has the power to adopt expropriation clauses in future IIAs has been controversial since the time the enlargement of the CCP was negotiated. While many commentators and apparently also EU Member States have referred to the exclusion of issues of property ownership from the scope of the TFEU and thus of the EU's external investment power, 79 the Commission seems determined to include expropriation among the topics the EU has the competence to deal with. Again the absence of any clear EU template makes it difficult to infer the precise scope and content of a potential EU expropriation clause. However, the pieces found in different documents may be put together to form a discernible mosaic. While the Council Negotiating Directives with Canada, India and Singapore speak of "protection against direct and indirect expropriation, including the right to prompt, adequate and effective compensation" 80 , the 2010 Commission Communication admonishes that the "Union should include precise clauses covering this issue [i.e. that expropriation measures should be non-discriminatory and proportionate to attain their legitimate objective] into its own future investment or trade agreements."
81 It would thus appear that any future expropriation clauses are likely to closely resemble the clauses found in existing EU Member State BITs. Whether it will also contain an attempt to more closely define the notion of indirect expropriation, as can be found in some more recent North American BITs 82 remains to be seen.
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D. The place of investor-state dispute settlement in the EU's investment architecture
In the initial phase of the discussion of a new EU external investment policy, the EU's institutions unsettled the investment community by their apparent reluctance towards investor-state dispute settlement. While the Commission was silent for a considerable period of time, it eventually came forward with a positive assessment. Still, the Parliament in particular voiced concern 84 about the far-reaching implications of ISDS that might compromise the right to regulate. This reserved stance was indeed irritating for states and investors which had accepted that ISDS fulfilled a crucial function in effectively securing the substantive protections granted in IIAs. 86 With the coming of age of ISDS in the 1990s and the first decade of the 21 st century it has become accepted that removing investment protection from the traditional paradigm of diplomatic protection has contributed to the de-politicization of investment disputes. 87 Meanwhile, the initial reluctance of the EU institutions seems to have given way to a full endorsement of ISDS. In its 2010 Communication on investment, the Commission acknowledged the importance of ensuring the effective enforceability of investment protection standards through ISDS which formed "a key part of the inheritance that the Union receives from Member State BITs."
88 And the Council in its Conclusions stressed "the need for an effective investor-to-state dispute settlement mechanism in the EU investment agreements." 89 Currently, the Commission appears determined to include ISDS and has even specifically addressed the issue of allocating responsibility (and in particular financial liability) between the Union and its Member States by proposing a regulation establishing a "framework for managing financial responsibility linked to investor-state dispute settlement tribunals".
90 This proposal builds on and deepens the template adopted already in the mid-1990s when the EC joined the Energy Charter Treaty (ECT) 91 as a full participant. Prior to the ECT's entry-intoforce, the EC confirmed that it can become a respondent to individual claims raised by investors, and that the Community and its Member States concerned would determine the proper respondent within 30 days of receiving such a request among themselves.
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In addition to the difficulty of allocating responsibility, ISDS raises serious problems as regards available arbitration venues. Investor-state arbitration and conciliation under the ruling out of legitimate public regulations; calls on the Commission to produce clear definitions of investor protection standards in order to avoid such problems in the new investment agreements."). 85 See also infra text at note 153. 86 (2007) 95 Thus, statehood is a clear requirement for adherence to the ICSID Convention which clearly prevents the EU in its current form from becoming a contracting party. Opening ICSID dispute settlement (conciliation and arbitration) to the EU would thus require a treaty revision which is theoretically possible, 96 practically, however, very unlikely to be achieved. 97 Nevertheless, the Commission stated its intention that it would explore this option. 98 In the medium term, it appears more realistic that the EU will adopt ISDS clauses providing for investment arbitration to be conducted under UNCITRAL 99 or other arbitration rules.
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Interestingly, the Commission has reacted to two specific issues frequently discussed in the investment arbitration community that have raised a certain degree of concern, the questions of sufficient transparency 101 and of potential inconsistencies of outcomes. 102 The Commission appears intent on addressing these problems by providing for a broad level of transparency in its future IIAs 103 and by taking into consideration the use of quasi-permanent arbitrators and the creation of appellate mechanisms. 104 The Parliament endorsed these thoughts and added further ideas for improvement, 105 such as the institutionalisation of amicus curiae participation 106 and the more controversial enhancement of the role of domestic courts through requiring exhaustion of local remedies.
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VI. Controversial Issues
As the preceding sections have shown an EU investment policy is gradually developing. However, there still remain many open issues some of which will be analysed in more detail in the following pages.
The precise scope of exclusive IIA powers after Lisbon remains unclear. Both the Union and its Member States -and apparently both the Commission and the Council -seem to pursue a broad approach towards future EU IIAs with regard to the inclusion of FDI as well as of provisions on expropriation and ISDS. They do so in a pragmatic way by proceeding on the basis of a mixed agreement without clearly determining their respective spheres of competences. However, that fact can only insufficiently veil the continuing divergences of opinions as to the true allocation of powers which also relates to the question of who is empowered to regulate questions concerning expropriation in future EU IIAs. Another highly contentious issue concerns the future of intra-EU-BITs, where some Member States and the EU seem to be on a collision course. But also in areas where there is less disagreement between the main actors questions remain open such the problem of the scope investments to be protected in future EU IIAs or the right balance between investment protection and regulatory freedom of the Member States and the EU. To another group of open issues belong problems rarely addressed in the official debate, such as whether the envisaged continuation of ISDS is compatible with the existing EU system of legal protection through the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU).
A. FDI or more -Does the EU's new investment power encompass portfolio investment?
Article 206 as well as 207 TFEU are fairly clear; they speak of "foreign direct investment" in circumscribing the new CCP power. In spite of this apparently limiting language, the EU Commission rejects a narrow reading of its investment powers and asserts that it also includes an implied power concerning portfolio investments. Most Member States and also the Council, representing Member States' interests, prefer a more textual interpretation and have expressed their view that the EU's powers are limited to FDI and do not include portfolio investments.
This question is a real and practical problem because modern BITs and IIAs usually cover both FDI and portfolio investments.
109 Thus, for the EU to enter the scene of investment treaty players it would be highly unorthodox if it wished to conclude agreements covering only FDI. In fact, the EU institutions have clearly expressed their view that future EU IIAs should broadly encompass both FDI and portfolio investment. 110 Therefore it is crucial to know whether the EU can conclude IIAs covering both FDI and portfolio investments itself or whether it needs the Member States. In the latter case, this would require the conclusion of socalled mixed agreements to be negotiated and concluded by both the EU and its Member States. 111 From a political perspective this is important since mixed agreements require separate ratification by the Member States. Today, this additional weight may appear not so crucial since the current rules of CCP treaty-making require unanimity in the Council in matters of FDI "where such agreements include provisions for which unanimity is required for the adoption of internal rules." 112 However, the evolution of the EU's gradual enlargement of the CCP has demonstrated a general shift from rule-making dominated by the Member States to centralized EC/EU legislation. 113 Similarly the current unanimity requirement for FDI matters in the Council may change in the future. In this situation, only a mixed competence would ensure sufficient bargaining power to the individual Member States.
The conflicting positions can be roughly summarized as follows: In its original Communication on an international investment policy, the Commission was not yet very clear on that point. It first elaborated on the definition of FDI as an investment "which serves to 19 establish lasting and direct links with the undertaking" without taking a clear stance on portfolio investment. 114 In a subsequent passage, entitled "Looking beyond foreign direct investment", the Commission suggested that "to the extent that international agreements on investment affect the scope of the common rules set by the Treaty's Chapter on capitals and payments, the exclusive Union competence to conclude agreements in this area would be implied." 115 In its 2012 Financial Responsibility Regulation proposal the Commission is much more explicit in asserting that "the Union has exclusive competence to conclude agreements covering all matters relating to foreign investment, that is both foreign direct investment and portfolio investment."
116 In addition to the express FDI power contained in Article 207 TFEU, the Commission clearly postulates an implied power relating to portfolio investment as well:
"The Union's competence for portfolio investment stems, in the Commission's view, from Article 63 TFEU. That article provides that the movement of capital between Member States of the Union and third countries is to be free of restrictions. Article 3(2) TFEU provides for the exclusive competence of the Union whenever rules included in an international agreement "may affect common rules or alter their scope". In the Commission's view, the Union must have exclusive competence also over matters of portfolio investment since the rules being envisaged, which would apply indistinctly to portfolio investment, may affect the common rules on capital movement set down in Article 63 of the Treaty." "The extension of the common commercial policy to "foreign direct investment" (Article 207.1 TFEU) confers exclusive competence on the European Union also in this area. Much, however, argues in favour of assuming that the term "foreign direct investment" only encompasses investment which serves to obtain a controlling interest in an enterprise […] . The consequence of this would be that exclusive competence only exists for investment of this type whereas investment protection agreements that go beyond this would have to be concluded as mixed agreements."
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The Member State opposition to the Commission's far-reaching competence claims also found its way into the Council's view. In its October 2012 Conclusions 119 commenting on the Commission's plans, the Council is less explicit but clearly stressed that the scope of the EU's exclusive CCP power related to FDI, 120 and admonished the Commission that the future broad investment policy covering all kinds of investment should be further elaborated "in full respect of the respective competences of the Union and its Member States as defined by the 114 Communication, COM (2010) 120 Ibid., para. 2 ("RECOGNIZING the importance of foreign direct investment within the scope of the EU exclusive competence for the common commercial policy under Articles 3(1) (e) and 207 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union;").
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Treaties." 121 A more explicit Council position can be found in its negotiation directives to the Commission regarding Canada, India and Singapore in which it requests the Commission to aim at including "into the investment protection chapter of the agreement areas of mixed competence, such as portfolio investment, […] ." 122 While these conflicting interpretations of the scope of the EU's are easily comprehensible from the perspective of the respective EU organ's institutional interests, the proper interpretation remains a difficult issue that has also received much academic attention. 123 The problem of the proper interpretation of the material scope of the EU's investment power is exacerbated by the lack of any meaningful drafting history of the Lisbon Treaty (or for that matter of the identically worded Constitution Treaty).
A limiting interpretation is clearly supported by the wording of the TFEU. The ordinary meaning of "foreign direct investment", as used in Articles 206 and 207 TFEU, comprises investment to the exclusion of portfolio investment. While the precise distinction and delimitation between FDI and portfolio may be difficult, a number of internationally used reference points have been made available by the OECD, 124 the IMF, 125 and also the EU has adopted secondary legislation on point.
126 121 Ibid., para. 7 ("ACKNOWLEDGING the importance of a comprehensive approach to shaping the future EU international investment policy that does not discriminate between different types of investors and their investments, SUPPORTS the definition of a broad scope for the new EU policy in this field as suggested by the Commission, to be further elaborated in full respect of the respective competences of the Union and its Member States as defined by the Treaties;"). See also the final para. 19 of the Council conclusions ("LOOKS forward to the Commission developing further initiatives as well as to working with the Commission and the European Parliament, through good cooperation and in full respect of the attribution of competences defined by the Treaties, to set up a comprehensive European international investment policy.").
Prima facie, the Commission position is certainly more difficult to defend. Why should the new CCP power encompass portfolio investment when only FDI is explicitly mentioned? Indeed, recognizing this textual obstacle the Commission suggests seeking an implied competence and considers that such an implied external power results from the express internal power of the EU to regulate the free movement of capital pursuant to Article 64 TFEU. 127 However, a closer look at the established EU doctrine of implied powers shows that the expansive interpretation given by the ECJ 128 and codified in the TFEU 129 is likely to be continued by the CJEU. In the field of investment this would make it probable that, if called to rule on such issue, the Court would consider also portfolio investment that can be regulated on the basis of Article 63 130 and 64 TFEU to be covered by the EU's implied external powers.
The question is likely to remain a theoretical problem since in practice the Council will not consent to a broad investment agreement suggested by the Commission without Member voting power of the direct investment enterprise. Direct investment may also allow the direct investor to gain access to the economy of the direct investment enterprise which it might otherwise be unable to do. The objectives of direct investment are different from those of portfolio investment whereby investors do not generally expect to influence the management of the enterprise."). 125 International Monetary Fund, Balance of Payments Manual, 5 th edition, 1993, para. 362, available at http://www.imf.org/external/np/sta/bop/BOPman.pdf. ("362. Reflecting the difference noted previously, a direct investment enterprise is defined in this Manual as an incorporated or unincorporated enterprise in which a direct investor, who is resident in another economy, owns 10 percent or more of the ordinary shares or voting power (for an incorporated enterprise) or the equivalent (for an unincorporated enterprise). Direct investment enterprises comprise those entities that are subsidiaries (a nonresident investor owns more than 50 percent), associates (an investor own 50 percent or less) and branches (wholly or jointly owned unincorporated enterprises) either directly or indirectly owned by the direct investor. […] ."). 126 Council Directive 88/361/EEC of 24 June 1988 for the implementation of Article 67 of the Treaty (1988) OJ L 178/5 ("Investments of all kinds by natural persons or commercial, industrial or financial undertakings, and which serve to establish or to maintain lasting and direct links between the person providing the capital and the entrepreneur to whom or the undertaking to which the capital is made available in order to carry on an economic activity. This concept must therefore be understood in its widest sense."). 127 Article 64(2) TFEU ("Whilst endeavouring to achieve the objective of free movement of capital between Member States and third countries to the greatest extent possible and without prejudice to the other Chapters of the Treaties, the European Parliament and the Council, acting in accordance with the ordinary legislative procedure, shall adopt the measures on the movement of capital to or from third countries involving direct investment -including investment in real estate -establishment, the provision of financial services or the admission of securities to capital markets."). 128 See the so-called ERTA Case, Case 22/70 Commission v. Council [1971] ECR 263 in which the ECJ affirmed the implied powers doctrine by stating that the authority to enter into international agreements "arises not only from an express conferment by the Treaty but may equally flow implicitly from other provisions of the Treaty, from the act of accession and from measures adopted within the framework of those provisions, by the Community institutions."; see also Opinion 2/91, ILO Convention No. 170 [1993] ECR I-1061 ("Authority to enter into international commitments may not only arise from an express attribution by the Treaty, but may also flow implicitly from its provisions […] whenever Community law created for the institutions of the Community powers within its internal system for the purpose of attaining a specific objective, the Community had authority to enter into the international commitments necessary for the attainment of that objective even in the absence of an express provision in that connection.") 129 Article 216(1) TFEU ("The Union may conclude an agreement with one or more third countries or international organisations where the Treaties so provide or where the conclusion of an agreement is necessary in order to achieve, within the framework of the Union's policies, one of the objectives referred to in the Treaties, or is provided for in a legally binding Union act or is likely to affect common rules or alter their scope.") 130 Article 64(2) TFEU ("Within the framework of the provisions set out in this Chapter, all restrictions on the movement of capital between Member States and between Member States and third countries shall be prohibited.").
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States participation. Thus, the intended broad scope of investment protection 131 will require close cooperation between the Commission and the Member States.
B. Should future EU IIAs protect all forms of investments?
Independent from the question of the allocation of treaty-making power for FDI "plus/minus portfolio investment" is the policy question whether future EU or mixed agreements covering investment should broadly cover all forms of investment or be more selective. This question is linked to a debate often addressed by critics of the current investment protection system who wish to differentiate between "useful", "genuine", "legitimate" investment that should be attracted by special host state protection and unwelcome forms of investment. This debate is related to the development impact discussion which led many capital importing countries to adopt admission requirements in order to screen useful investments and to disallow unwelcome investments.
132 A similar effect was intended by so-called performance requirements; however, due to the fact that most IIAs and in particular trade treaties consider performance requirements to be distortive of competition they are generally less and less used.
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Today, such concerns have been taken up by the EU Parliament which has espoused calls for limiting investment protection to "non-speculative" investments. However, uncertainty stems from the fact that the Parliament has expressly called for the exclusion of "speculative forms of investment". 134 In practice, it would appear difficult to distinguish between "speculative" and "non-speculative" portfolio (or even direct) investment. Neither the Parliament nor any other EU institution has offered any precise definition of "non-speculative" investments that should enjoy future IIA protection, though Parliament specifically requested Commission to provide a clear definition of what kind of the investments should be protected. 135 In its reaction, the Commission pointed towards the difficulty of such a distinction and stressed that "speculative" investment should not be equated with portfolio investment. 136 It also suggested that speculative forms of investment would not be protected by future investment agreements because such agreements regularly do not protect "ordinary commercial transactions" and by extension not "short term investments". 137 131 See Communication, COM(2010) 343 final 4, supra note 18, 2-4; see also The Council Negotiating Directives (Canada, India and Singapore), supra note 26, under "Scope". 132 CITE LIT ##. 133 CITE LIT ##. 134 See Parliament Resolution, supra note 21, para. 11 ("Asks the Commission to provide a clear definition of the investments to be protected, including both FDI and portfolio investment; considers, however, that speculative forms of investment, as defined by the Commission, shall not be protected; insists that where intellectual property rights are included in the scope of the investment agreement, including these agreements where draft mandates have already been proposed, the provisions should avoid negatively impacting the production of generic medicines and must respect the TRIPS exceptions for public health;"). 135 Ibid. 136 European Commission, Follow up to the European Parliament Resolution on the future European international investment policy, adopted by the Commission on 5 July 2011, supra note 23, 3 ("Speculation has never been regarded as being synonymous to portfolio investment.").
It is true that investment tribunals, both ICSID and non-ICSID panels, have developed techniques to distinguish between "investments" and "ordinary commercial transactions" with the effect that the latter would not fall under the protection of investment tribunals. Through the precise limitation may be difficult, tribunals have consistently held that purely commercial transactions such as sales contracts or the acquisition of "receivables" from a private company do not qualify as investments. 138 However, "ordinary commercial transactions" often are far from speculative "transactions", but rather relate to the payment for goods or services. Thus, the lack of protection for "ordinary commercial transactions" does not imply that "short term investments" or even "speculative" investments would be automatically excluded as a result of the established jurisprudence of investment tribunals to exclude "ordinary commercial transactions" from the notion of "investments".
In the practice of investment protection, similar concerns about "unwelcome" investments have been addressed in different ways. One approach of distinguishing between welcome and unwelcome types of investment can be found in the discussion of an implied "investment" notion under the ICSID Convention which clearly goes beyond the mere differentiation between "investments" and "ordinary commercial transactions".
139 ICSID jurisprudence has developed a test concerning the jurisdictional requirement of an "investment" pursuant to Article 25 ICSID Convention and given different weight, in particular, to the notion of a contribution to the host state development.
140 Since the Salini case, a certain contribution to the host state development figures prominently in ICSID case-law nest to a certain duration, risk participation and a certain total value contribution when it comes to define the unwritten jurisdictional requirement of an "investment".
141
Similar to the non-written contribution to the host state development element, the nonspeculative character of an investment could be regarded as a jurisdictional requirement in future EU IIAs -one that may even be expressly laid down in such treaties. An explicit inscription of such a requirement would certainly avoid problems along the line of the longstanding ICSID controversy whether the "contribution"-requirement is an intended part of the 25 notion of investments.
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protecting established investors within the host state.
[…] As far as the Commission is aware, up to now no tribunal has ever decided upon a dispute arising out of a short term investment in the capital market of the host state."). 138 See, e.g., Global Trading Resources Corp. and Globex International, Inc. v. Ukraine, ICSID Case No. ARB/09/11, Award (Dec. 1, 2010), para. 56 ("[P] urchase and sale contracts entered into by the Claimants were pure commercial transactions and therefore cannot qualify as an investment for the purposes of Article 25 of the Convention."); Alps Finance v. Slovak Republic, UNCITRAL, Award, 5 March 2011, considering that a "mere one-off sale transaction" would not qualify as an investment. 139 See supra text at note 136. 140 141 See Salini Costruttori S.p.A. and Italstrade S.p.A. v However, as with the opaque notion of the "contribution" to the host state development, there remains the problem of the proper identification of non-speculative investments. ICSID cases that have relied on the need to demonstrate a contribution to the host state development have often taken rather subjective concepts when deciding that the services of a law firm or the salvaging operations for historical ships do not contribute to such development. 143 While the underlying rationale may have been a crude preference for green-field FDI, there is no clear explanation why the provision of legal services or the development of aqua-touristic sites or museums should not contribute to the development of host states.
Another technique to address concerns about "illegitimate" investments is the limitation of investment protection to investment "in accordance with the law of the host Similarly, practical problems are likely to arise should the EU adopt such plans to carve out "speculative" investments from the broad and all-encompassing investment definition. The uncertainty surrounding the proper notion of "investment" was clearly damaging for ICSID and may in the long run deter investors from using ICSID, relying on UNCITRAL 152 or other investment arbitration rules instead which do not have such a requirement. In a similar way, uncertainty about the exact scope of protected investment could be damaging for future EU IIAs because it might insert a considerable degree of unpredictability as to the jurisdictional threshold to be overcome in order to hear a dispute on the merits.
C. The integration of broader, non-economic concerns into future EU IIAs
The emergence of effective investment protection since the late 1990s primarily through the availability of effective ISDS has led to a growing uneasiness among many host states, including some EU Member States, fearing that too effective investment protection may become too costly and ultimately deter from adopting legitimate policy measures. 153 This true or perceived danger of a so-called regulatory chill 154 has led to outright denunciation of the current system 155 and (even in OECD countries) to attempts to moderate investment protection by balancing investor concerns with governmental interests. 156 These anxieties have also been picked up by the EU institutions. In its 2010 Communication, the Commission stated with regard to the potential breadth of indirect expropriation that " [a] clear formulation of the balance between the different interests at stake, such as the protection of investors against unlawful expropriation or the right of each Party to regulate in the public interest, needs to be ensured."
157 It further stated that "Investment agreements should be consistent with the other policies of the Union and its Member States, including policies on the protection of the environment, decent work, health and safety at work, consumer protection, cultural diversity, development policy and competition policy."
158 These concerns are shared in principle by the Council, admonishing in its Negotiating Directives with Canada, India, and Singapore the need to guarantee an appropriate regulatory space for the EU and its Member States by cautioning that an EU investment agreement "shall be without prejudice to the right of the EU and the Member States to adopt and enforce, in accordance with their respective competences, measures necessary to pursue legitimate public policy objectives such as social, environmental, security, public health and safety in a non-discriminatory manner." 159 Such language is reminiscent of the police powers doctrine, 160 as endorsed by some investment tribunals 161 and found in the explanatory parts of US 162 and Canadian 163 Model BITs. It will leave considerable leeway for treaty negotiators to draft the respective treatment standards and possible exception clauses. These concerns were even reinforced by the European Parliament which expressed its irritation with the regulatory chill of investment arbitration 164 and specifically called upon the Commission "to include in all future agreements specific clauses laying down the right of parties to the agreement to regulate, inter alia, in the construed to prevent a Party from adopting, maintaining or enforcing any measure otherwise consistent with this Agreement that it considers appropriate to ensure that investment activity is undertaken in a manner sensitive to health, safety or environmental concerns.").
areas of protection of national security, the environment, public health, workers' and consumers' rights, industrial policy and cultural diversity." 165 In its response, the Commission pointed to the EU's practice to include a general right to regulate in its FTAs and that it intends to continue this practice in its negotiations. 166 While finding the proper balance between investment and non-investment interests will indeed be one of the core issues for future EU IIAs, 167 it is questionable whether the incorporation of standard clauses preserving the contracting states' right to regulate which accomplish that goal. At present there is not yet sufficient practice to determine how investment tribunals would interpret such general clauses in order to assess whether the intended effect can be achieved.
D. Consequences of the shift of treaty-making powers for existing Member State BITs with third parties
With the intensifying discussion over the content of future EU IIAs, the initial debate about the future of existing Member State BITs "after Lisbon" has receded.
168 Nevertheless, what was clearly recognized as a crucial issue of legal certainty early on remains an important and still unsolved problem. The problem's core is easy to describe. If and to the extent that the EU has acquired an exclusive competence over investment matters, such shift of powers leads to a corresponding loss of powers on the part of the Member States.
As a consequence, existing Member State BITs become "unconstitutional" under EU law. Of course, this does not automatically affect their validity under international law but from the perspective of EU law the exclusive CCP power implies that only the EU can lawfully enter into and be a partner to treaties with third countries addressing subject-matters covered by the CCP.
Since this "loss" of Member State powers took effect with the entry-into-force of the Lisbon Treaty on 1 December 2009, a quick pragmatic solution had to be found. In fact, EU law permits the Union to authorize the Member States to act in fields of its own exclusive powers.
169 Such a re-transfer of powers was envisaged early on in the July 2010 Commission proposal for a so-called grandfathering regulation 170 which would authorize Member State BITs through a grant back of competences. Reportedly, the Commission had already 165 Parliament Resolution, supra note 21, para. 35. 166 European Commission, Follow up to the European Parliament Resolution on the future European international investment policy, adopted by the Commission on 5 July 2011, supra note 23, 5 ("[T]he inclusion […] of specific clauses laying down the right […] to regulate (inter alia, in the areas of protection of national security, the environment, public health, workers' and consumers' rights, industrial policy and cultural diversity) is largely consistent with the current practice of the EU, which includes a similar statement in the general part of all its Free Trade Agreements (FTAs) in order to cover not only investment, but all other disciplines as well. To the extent that investment protection Chapters will be part of a FTA, this general affirmation will also apply to them, and will be replicated in any investment protection agreement.") 167 which was made public by the Commission in summer 2010 basically lays down "the terms, conditions and the procedure under which Member States are authorised to maintain in force, amend or conclude bilateral agreements with third countries relating to investment."
173 Such authorization should be given as a matter of course with regard to duly notified Member State BITs as long as they do not conflict with EU law, overlap with EU treaties or obstruct the EU's investment policy. 174 However, the Proposal did not meet unanimous approval by the Member States because it included rather stringent Commission screening powers of existing BITs as well IIAs to be negotiated and concluded by Member States in the future. 175 Member States apparently fear the loss of control and have a sense of being more and more at the mercy of the Commission with regard to their investment policies.
This Member State reluctance towards the draft grandfathering regulation may be one of the reasons why it has remained only a proposal since summer 2010. As of December 2012, the draft proposal still has not yet been adopted. However, this is not only a timing problem but also one of defective legal certainty. As long as there is no explicit legal basis existing Member State BITs are no longer in conformity with EU law. Although the Commission is currently unlikely to institute legal proceedings against Member States, the fact that it did pursue such a course of action with regard to comparatively minor EU law inconsistencies in the cases concerning the transfer provisions of Austrian, Finish and Swedish BITs 176 has alerted Member States that legal action is not excluded.
E. The impact on intra-EU-BITs
An issue related to the question of the effect of the transfer of IIA powers on existing Member State BITs with third countries is the question whether the new investment competence of the EU implies that BITs concluded among Member States, so-called intra-EU-BITs, have become incompatible with EU law and whether such potential incompatibility implies their automatic termination or requires that they be terminated by the Member States. 174 See Articles 5 and 6 Commission Proposal "grandfathering regulation", COM (2010) 344, supra note 17, with regard to Member State BITs in force. 175 See in particular, Articles 5 and 6 as well as 11 and 12 of the draft regulation, Commission Proposal "grandfathering regulation", COM (2010) 344, supra note 17. 176 See supra text at note 75. 177 In the course of a number of investment arbitrations, some Member States (in their role as respondents) have in fact asserted that the incompatibility between intra-EU-BITs and EU law would lead to the formers' automatic termination. 178 The Commission has been slightly more cautious by asserting that such incompatibility would not lead to an automatic termination, but rather require the Member States to terminate their intra-EU-BITs. 179 Investment tribunals have generally rejected the claim that intra-EU-BITs and EU law would be incompatible as matter of treaty law. As a result they have usually upheld their jurisdiction based on the continued validity of intra-EU-BITs. The Eastern Sugar tribunal rejected the argument that the alleged incompatibility would have led to an automatic treaty termination pursuant to Article 59 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT), 180 holding that the Czech Republic/Netherlands BIT and EU law did "not cover the same precise subjectmatter." 181 Similarly, the tribunal in Eureko v. Slovakia 182 dismissed the "intra-EU jurisdictional objection", holding that the BIT provisions have "not been displaced by EU law" as a result of Article 59 VCLT, 183 nor have they been "disapplied by EU law" as a result of Article 30 VCLT. 184 The issue may of course be largely a question of perspective. From an EU law perspective, the incompatibility may stem, for instance, from the fact that intra-EU-BITs grant nationals of specific EU Member States procedural rights like ISDS that would not be available to other EU nationals and thus lead to discrimination. 185 Under accepted EU principles like supremacy/primacy it would clearly follow that any inconsistence between EU law and national law must lead to a "disapplication" of national law. 186 In the opinion of the These concerns stem from a line of ECJ cases that have vigilantly safeguarded the spheres of exclusive jurisdiction enjoyed by the Court as the sole authentic interpreter of Community, now Union law. The judicial autonomy claim is based on the EU's constituent treaty which provides not only for various forms of exclusive competence of the CJEU, but also for an explicit prohibition for the Member States to have their EU law related disputes settled by any other court or tribunal.
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This latter prohibition played an important role in the so-called MOX Plant case 199 in which the Commission successfully brought infringement proceedings against Ireland because the latter had instituted arbitral proceedings against the UK under the UN Law of the Sea Convention. 200 In the view of the ECJ, the law of the sea issues raised in that arbitration came within the scope of Community competence and were thus part of a dispute concerning the interpretation or application of Community law. 201 Since both the MOX Plant case as well as Article 344 TFEU expressly refer to inter-state disputes it is unlikely that investor-state arbitration would be regarded incompatible with this form of exclusivity. 202 However, from a broader perspective it cannot be excluded that the CJEU might find fault in a system of ISDS regularly provided for in future EU IIAs where such investor-state arbitration tribunals may deal with questions of EU law. This could be the case if the Court followed an interpretation given to the nature of investment arbitration as the procedural option for private parties to enforce the international law claims of their home states. 203 In order to understand the background of such a possible curb on ISDS by the CJEU it is important to appreciate the Court's past case-law and position vis-à-vis its potential judicial competitors.
The first clear manifestation of such a defensive stance can be found in the Court's Advisory Opinion on the European Economic Area (EEA) Agreement 204 which intended to set up a parallel system of judicial protection covering both the EC and EFTA states joined in the EEA enterprise. While the ECJ found that the Community's treaty-making power in the field of an enlarged free trade agreement comprised also the power to agree on binding dispute settlement, 205 it considerably limited this position by holding that such a dispute settlement institution would be prevented from ruling on issues concerning the allocation of competences Member State, 220 though it has been suggested that one could regard treaty-based arbitration as arbitration being based on national law. 221 Thus, any suggestions to remedy the uncertain situation by "upgrading" 222 investor-state tribunals to "tribunals" entitled to make preliminary references in order to make the system of ISDS compatible with EU law remain fraught with difficulties.
VII. Conclusions
After initial concerns about the EU's investment policy to be carried out by the Commission, which were fuelled by the latter's reluctance to take clear positions on a wide range of crucial issues, it now appears that, three years after the entry-into-force of the Lisbon Treaty, some contours of future EU IIAs are beginning to emerge, seemingly also still recognizable as "European". It is to be expected that future EU IIAs will largely resemble the typical BITs concluded by its Member States, though there may be a few additions in particular in the field of ensuring sufficient regulatory space for host states and addressing some recent concerns surrounding ISDS.
However, there still remain a number of open questions: Will the EU alone be competent to conclude IIAs covering both FDI and portfolio investment? Is it possible and is it in the interest of the EU to protect only certain kinds of investment? What will happen to existing BITs and other IIAs concluded by the Member States with third parties; what with intra-EUBITs? Will the CJEU accept a system of ISDS that may have implications on the interpretation and application of EU law? While many of these questions will have to be addressed in the current effort to shape a future EU investment policy it is likely that the final word will come from the CJEU … and that maybe only in a few years.
